Skip to main content

OT/ICS Security Assessment

OT and ICS security assessment for Indonesian mining operators

In short

How Indonesian mining operators assess OT and ICS security across autonomous haulage, remote operations, and processing ICS under IEC 62443 and Perpres 82.

OT/ICS security assessment

A modern Indonesian mine runs on operational technology that was never designed to sit within reach of the internet. Autonomous haulage, a remote operations centre, and processing ICS were built to keep production moving safely, not to withstand a hostile network, yet remote monitoring has connected much of that estate to paths the operator has often not fully mapped. This page covers what an OT and ICS security assessment looks at across a mining operation specifically, how it maps against IEC 62443 and Perpres 82/2022, and how it runs without disrupting live extraction or processing. For what an OT/ICS security assessment covers as a general service, see our OT/ICS Security Assessment service page.

Why a mining OT assessment is a different exercise

A failure in a mining OT environment is rarely just downtime. A fleet-management system issuing a bad instruction to an autonomous truck, a processing ICS accepting an unauthorised setpoint, or an environmental monitoring feed quietly manipulated are safety, production, and legal questions before they are IT questions.

Autonomous haulage and fleet management

Autonomous haulage and fleet-management systems coordinate heavy equipment moving across an active pit. A compromise here is not a data problem first, it is a physical one, which is why the system has to be assessed for exposure without any active traffic being sent into the live network.

Remote operations centre

A remote operations centre concentrates control over multiple sites into one place, which also concentrates the consequence if an attacker reaches it. The assessment checks how that centre connects to each mine, how remote sessions are authenticated and logged, and whether a foothold there can reach control systems.

Blast control and ore-processing ICS

Blast control systems and the ICS running ore processing sit at the point where a security failure and a physical hazard are the same event. These are reviewed at the configuration and architecture level, never actively probed on a live system.

Reporting integrity and commodity intelligence

An attacker who alters ESDM environmental or production records creates regulatory and legal exposure, and one who quietly reads ore reserve estimates, production cost data, or export shipping schedules can stay unnoticed for months. Both make the resource and geological data stores part of the assessment scope, not an afterthought.

Perpres 82/2022 and PP 71/2019 place mining within the critical national infrastructure whose electronic systems the state expects operators to protect, with obligations covering electronic system security, incident reporting, and data localisation for strategic systems. Those regulations set the obligation to protect the infrastructure; they do not spell out what an adequate technical control looks like at the level of a fleet-management network or a processing ICS conduit. That is the gap IEC 62443, the international standard for industrial automation and control system security, is built to fill, and it is the framework this assessment is structured around. UU PDP sits alongside both, because a mine also holds employee, contractor, and community personal data, including health-monitoring and biometric access records that carry their own protection duty.

What the assessment mapsWhere it comes fromWhat the assessment produces
Critical national infrastructure and electronic system protectionPerpres 82/2022, PP 71/2019Estate-level findings a mining operator can use as supporting evidence of its security posture and incident-reporting readiness
Zone and conduit segmentation, security levels for OT assetsIEC 62443A gap assessment against IEC 62443 zones, with findings prioritised by exploitability and operational impact, not CVSS score alone
Protection of employee, contractor, and community personal dataUU PDPFindings covering where health-monitoring, biometric access, and community data sit relative to the OT and IT boundary

What the assessment covers and how it runs

The assessment spans the operation rather than a single subsystem: the pit and its autonomous fleet, the remote operations centre, the processing plant, and the data stores and boundaries that tie them together.

Autonomous haulage and fleet-management systemsRemote operations centre and its site connectionsBlast control systems, reviewed at configuration and architecture level onlyOre-processing plant ICSEnvironmental monitoring systemsResource and geological data storesIT/OT boundary and remote-monitoring pathsPLC and RTU configuration, including default credentials and firmware versions
Scope and authorise with site management and operationsPassive discovery across the OT estate, no active scanning of live control systemsArchitecture review of the IT/OT boundary and remote-monitoring pathsConfiguration analysis mapped to IEC 62443 zones and conduitsReport prioritised by exploitability and operational impact

Every phase is authorised before it starts and coordinated with the operations team throughout, because an OT/ICS assessment cannot run on the same assumptions as an IT penetration test. Passive discovery observes traffic without sending packets that could affect a field device, an autonomous haulage controller, or a processing system, and blast control and safety-related systems are reviewed at the configuration level only, never actively tested against a live installation.

For the wider picture of OT and ICS security across Indonesian industrial operators, our OT and ICS cybersecurity in Indonesia guide sets out the threat model and methodology in general terms. If your priority is structured alignment to the standard this assessment maps against, our IEC 62443 compliance assessment page covers that route specifically.

Sector-specific figures for OT incident frequency or downtime cost in Indonesian mining are not backed by a primary source we could verify, so this page leads with the regulatory and technical framing rather than a number that would not hold up to scrutiny. What is consistent across nickel, coal, and bauxite operators is that remote monitoring has connected control systems to the internet faster than anyone has mapped those connections, and the assessment is usually most useful where that map does not yet exist.

If your mine has never had a consistent assessment of its OT and ICS estate against IEC 62443, our team can help you scope where to start.

References

  1. 1.Republic of Indonesia, Perpres No. 82 Tahun 2022 on Vital Information Infrastructure Protection
  2. 2.Republic of Indonesia, PP No. 71 Tahun 2019 on Electronic System and Transaction Administration
  3. 3.ISA, ISA-99 / IEC 62443 Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security
  4. 4.Republic of Indonesia, UU No. 27 Tahun 2022 (UU PDP)

Reviewed by Karina Kosasih, Offensive Security Lead

Frequently asked questions

There is no single mining-specific testing mandate, but the obligation exists in substance. Perpres 82/2022 and PP 71/2019 treat mining as part of the critical national infrastructure whose electronic systems must be protected, with incident reporting and, for strategic systems, data localisation. UU PDP separately requires appropriate technical measures over the employee, contractor, and community personal data a mine holds, including health-monitoring and biometric access records. An OT/ICS assessment mapped against IEC 62443 is one of the more direct ways to show those measures actually hold rather than exist on paper.

Related

Ready to strengthen your security posture?

Talk to our Jakarta-based team about your requirements.

Jakarta-based team. We reply within one business day.